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SHOULD THE U.S. CONSTITUTION BE AMENDED
TO REQUIRE PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION?:
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Henry Sanders* and Rose M. Sanders**
BASIC PROPOSITION
A constitutional amendment requiring proportional repre-
sentation (proportional representation) is absolutely necessary.
Our political system is unfair to ethnic, political and other
minorities. The system cannot provide fairness because it is
"winner take all" and defective in its foundation. The only solu-
tion is proportional representation, which will provide majority
rule and fair minority representation. A constitutional amend-
ment is the only means to achieve proportional representation in
the USA.
BASIC RESPONSE
A constitutional amendment is neither necessary or appro-
priate. Of course, our political system is not perfect. However,
neither is any other political system perfect, including those that
utilize proportional representation. The present system, how-
ever, is becoming fairer with implementation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) as amended.' It is the best available
means considering the circumstances.
PROPOSITION
The term proportional representation is a broad concept
that is loosely used. For purposes of this article, a definition is in
order.
Proportional representation is political representation in
* Senator, Alabama State Senate, and Attorney at Law.
** Partner, Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Turner.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
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multi-member governing bodies such as the U.S. Congress, state
legislatures, county governing bodies, city councili, boards of ed-
ucation, etc. in proportion to the percentage of popular vote re-
ceived in the election. The term does not commonly embody ra-
cial percentages and race. John R. Low-Beer, in The
Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation,
states: "Proportional representation is an electoral system char-
acterized by at-large elections in which the seats are divided
among parties and/or individuals in proportion to the number of
votes received by each."2
RESPONSE
Proportional representation may be definable in theory but
is more difficult to define in practice. To be sure, there is consid-
erable confusion in the theory. The most common definition im-
plies representation in elective office in proportion to the per-
centage of a given voting group in the total population. It
applies equally to ethnic, political, religious, and other grouping.
However, for purposes of discussion, I am willing to use the fol-
lowing definition advanced by Sister Rose M. Sanders: "propor-
tional representation is political representation in proportion to
voting percentage in legislative and other multi-member gov-
erning bodies such as county governing bodies, City Councils,
Boards of Education, etc."
A description of proportional representation is provided by
the New Encyclopedia Britannica as follows: "proportional rep-
resentation is an electoral device based on the principle that the
distribution of seats in a representative assembly should reflect
as exactly as possible the distribution of the electors' votes
among the competing parties or contending candidates.'
I am not, however, willing to concede that the term excludes
racial or ethnic percentages. If the term excludes either, explic-
itly or implicitly, it is useless to discuss proportional representa-
tion at this National Conference of Black Lawyers whose theme
is "The Constitution and Race: A Critical Perspective.",
2. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94
YALE L.J. 163, 164 n.4 (1984) [hereinafter Low-Beer].
3. 25 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1007 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter BRITANNICA].
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PROPOSITION
Our system is philosophically and fundamentally flawed.
Theoretically, under our system, a party or other political
group may receive 50.1% of the vote and all 435 seats in the
United States Congress and/or all seats in other multi-member
bodies. Conversely, another group may receive 49.9% of the
vote, perhaps millions of votes, and obtain zero representation in
Congress and/or other multi-member bodies. As a result, the
views of a near majority are totally unrepresented in multi-
member bodies. Such a result is absolutely contradictory to the
very basis of multi-member political bodies which seek a diver-
sity of experiences and views in order to collectively devise a
common solution to each of the various political problems.
Any system that allows the theoretical negation of its entire
purpose is fundamentally defective. At some point, Murphy's
Law will reign true: "If anything can go wrong, it will." A consti-
tutional amendment requiring proportional representation will
eliminate this basic flaw.
RESPONSE
Our system is philosophically and fundamentally sound.
Anything is possible. Therefore we cannot base our actions
on the elimination of all possibilities. Instead we must use rea-
sonable probabilities, i.e., that exclusion is improbable, as the
foundation to construct political and other systems.
Just to pursue the theoretical point to its logical conclusion,
it is possible to have all 435 members of Congress and other
multi-member bodies elected from one party under proportional
representation. If the other group does not vote or actively par-
ticipate in an election, then a one-party result is possible.
In large multi-member representative bodies from diverse
regions of the country, it is highly unlikely all members will be
elected from one party or group. Of course this possibility is less
remote in smaller bodies selected from compact areas. However,
we must admit that large party majorities have occasionally re-
sulted under the present system and are probable under certain
circumstances.
It must also be said, however, that under our current system
we vote for individuals more than parties. Therefore, large party
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majorities are not necessarily reflective of the party line or posi-
tion. After all, the Democratic Party, the dominant legislative
party over the last 55 years, consistantly maintains conservative
and progressive wings.
In short, there is wide diversity among individual members
regardless of the party. The emergence of mass communication
insures parties will be even less significant, particularly in multi-
member political bodies.
PROPOSITION
The problems with our electoral system are not just theoret-
ical but real for both ethnic and political minorities. Blacks and
Hispanics comprise a measly 3% of the membership of Congress
while compromising nearly 20% of the country's population.4
Minority representation does not match its population propor-
tion in any state legislative body. Alabama, with 24 Blacks of
140 legislators, comes closest.' However, that number amounts
to just 17% of the legislative membership in a state whose mi-
nority population exceeds 25%. In other words, the best legisla-
tive representation in the entire country is just 68% or two-
thirds of its comparable minority population.'
The percentages for multi-member bodies lower than legis-
lators are not available but are undoubtedly much worse. Any
way you view it, Blacks and other ethnic minorities receive far
less than 50% of their fair representation.'
I suspect the representation record for political minorities is
even more dismal. The meager advances made by ethnic minori-
ties have come as a result of great struggle, constitutional
amendments, a voting rights statute and strong Supreme Court
support of minority representation. No such forces are available
for political minorities. In fact, cases have clearly established
that political groups have "no constitutional claim to representa-
tion."8 In fact, in the long struggle to protect minority rights, no
basis for protection of political groups has been established.'
4. Alabama Legislative Reference Service [hereinafter Alabama].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1979).
9. Low-Beer, supra note 2, at 176 n.3.
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The impact of the "winner take all" electoral system is well
illustrated by the case of The Liberal Party v. Great Britain,10
which was brought before the European Commission on Human
Rights in the late seventies. The Liberal Party had received a
substantial popular vote but had not received a majority vote in
any one Parliamentary contest. As a consequence, the party had
no representation in Parliament. The Liberal Party did not pre-
vail in the action but raised strong issues of equality of access,
equality of influence and equality of representation." The basic
problem for the Liberal Party and Great Britain is endemic in
the American political system.
With ethnic minorities underrepresented after great effort,
and political minorities virtually unrepresented and unpro-
tected, it's time for a change for the better in our lifetime. As
stated by Low-Beer:
The constitutional values at stake ... can be fully guar-
anteed only by proportional representation. If minority
representation is either desirable ... or mandated ....
proportional representation is the only electoral system
that can give equal representation to all groups. Propor-
tional representation also achieves majority rule. It is the
only system that can simultaneously guarantee the indi-
vidual and group right to both an equally weighted vote
and an equally meaningful vote. 2
RESPONSE
Minorities are certainly underrepresented in the American
political configuration. This is, however, less a function of the
political system than certain historical and powerful social forces
such as racism. Given the power and pervasiveness of these
Under the present electoral system, it is impossible to grant equally powerful
votes without first specifying which groups will be represented and then gerry-
mandering very carefully - and even then, some groups will not be proportion-
ally represented. Ironically, the system that is apparently defined without refer-
ence to groups requires that specific groups be cognized in the districting
process.
Id.
10. Liberal Party v. Great Britain,
11. A. Boyle, Electoral Fairness and the Liberal Party, 1981 Public Law 574.
12. Low-Beer, supra note 2, at 182.
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forces, any constitutional system would bend before such power-
ful social prejudices. In light of such potent prejudices, propor-
tional representation would not have served minorities any bet-
ter than the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to
the U.S. Constitution and the various implementing statutes.
Note that the constitutional amendments were virtually ignored
for nearly a century.1 3 We have the same constitutional amend-
ments now as when the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson14 and
placed the "separate but equal" yoke around the neck of minori-
ties for nearly sixty years.'"
The effectiveness of constitutional and statutory provisions
must be judged within the context of social forces operating at a
particular time. In this light, the present constitutional provi-
sions and inplementation statutes have worked well in recent
years. In the twenty-two years since the passage of the Voting
Rights Act in 1965, the percentage of Black elected officials has
risen dramatically.' 6 More importantly, the numbers continue to
rise.17 We are now making fairness a reality in political represen-
tation. It certainly has been a struggle and will continue to be so.
However, we would experience the same struggle with propor-
tional representation embedded in the Constitution.
PROPOSITION
The Voting Rights Act, which some proportional represen-
tation opponents proudly point to as a solution to the minority
representation problem, is not only inadequate but absolutely
fails to resolve the basic dilemma of equality of access (one per-
son, one vote) and equality of influence and representation (fair
minority representation). It has not and cannot solve these
problems for many reasons.
Section 5, which requires preclearance for changes which af-
fect voting, is subjected to the Court imposed retrogression prin-
ciple. 8 That is, the change is permissible if the minority group is
13. L. BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER, A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA ( ) [here-
inafter L. BENNETT].
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. L. BENNETT, supra note 13, at
16. Alabama, supra note 4.
17. Id.
18. Jacobs & O'Rourkes, Racial Polarization in Vote Dilution Cases Under Section 2
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no worse off than before the change. This development dilutes
opportunities to increase minority representation. There is no
sound reason that Section 5 preclearance should not require the
same standard as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which re-
quires fair representation."' Section 5 impacts far more voting
situations and increases minority representation with limited ex-
penditure of time, money and other resources. Section 2 litiga-
tion, on the other hand, necessitates great expenditure of the
same resources.
Minorities require at least a 65% population majority in a
district to insure an opportunity to elect a minority candidate (a
safe district). As a result, minorities receive less winnable dis-
tricts than their bare population entitles. In addition, many mi-
norities do not reside in areas sufficiently large, contiguous and
compact to compose a district of winnable proportions.
Joe Reed, the Chairman of the Alabama Democratic Confer-
ence, a Black political organization in Alabama, says that the 24
Black legislative districts (two-thirds of population ratio) in Ala-
bama are all that can be obtained under the single member dis-
tricting method.20 This vividly demonstrates the inherent limita-
tions of single member districts and the Voting Rights Act in
achieving fair representation.
The real issue in representation is position on ideas, con-
cepts and programs. Race cuts across all three. The present elec-
tion method, even with maximum districts for minority repre-
sentation, makes little allowance for this reality.
With a stroke of the pen, proportional representation would
effectively solve each of these problems in a way that the Voting
Rights Act and the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the
Constitution cannot achieve in another 100 years.
RESPONSE
The Voting Rights Act is a powerful tool in achieving fair
ethnic minority representation. To appreciate where we are, we
of the Voting Rights Act: The Impact of Thornburg v. Gingles, 3 J. L. POL. 295 (1986)
[hereinafter Jacobs] (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 439
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982))).
19. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
20. Personal Conversation with Joe Reed, Chairman of the Alabama Democratic
Conference.
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must understand where we came from and how.
Prior to 1964, America was not only absent of significant
minority representation in legislative and other multi-member
governing bodies, but was dominated by a powerful minority of
rural legislators through mal-apportioned districts. In 1964, the
Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. Sims, which propounded
the much repeated principle/phrase, "one person (man), one
vote."21 In 1965, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was enacted. It
placed emphasis on minority representation.2 2 Both Sims and
VRA built on the foundation laid by Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
which struck down the 28-sided boundary of Tuskegee, Ala-
bama, designed to prevent Blacks from achieving elective office
in that city.2
The concepts embodied in Sims and the Voting Rights Act
have shaped the electoral dialogue for over twenty years. To a
significant degree, the concepts are in conflict: The one person,
one vote principle seeks equal representation in compact dis-
tricts whereas the minority representation principle seeks dis-
tricts in which minorities have a voting majority and opportu-
nity to win elections. As a rule, the greater the effort to insure
minority representation, the greater the deviation from the one
person, one vote principle. Thus, the continuing struggle to se-
cure both majority rule and minority representation.2'
The Constitution, with major statutory assistance25 and pos-
itive interpretation, has adapted to insure minority representa-
tion. The process, of course, is incomplete. The progress in mi-
nority representation, however, strongly suggests a
constitutional amendment requiring proportional representation
is neither necessary nor appropriate. This type of adaptation is
the genius of the U.S. Constitution.
The VRA is the center piece of the statutory assistance
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In large measure, it is
the reason that proportional representation is not necessary to
achieve minority representation. Its profound eff..ct on minority
representation requires a closer examination of the statute itself.
21. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
23. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
24. Low-Beer, supra note 2, at 172-75 nn.50-61.
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
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Basically there are two critical sections of the Voting Rights
Act, Section 2 and Section 5. Section 5 provides for preclearance
by the U.S. Department of Justice of acts, statutes, rules, cus-
toms and practices which affect voting directly or indirectly and
arise in certain defined areas of the country.26 Section 5, al-
though limited by application of the Court-devised retrogression
principle, has had a significant impact on increasing minority
representation over the first twenty years of VRA."
It is Section 2, however, that has had the greater impact in
recent years.2 8 Section 2, as amended, provides the following:
1. Prohibits any system which results in the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote;
2. Provides the opportunity for members of a racial
or language minority to participate on an equal footing
with other members of the electorate;
3. Provides the opportunity for minorities to elect
candidates of their choice;
4. Requires Courts to use a totality of circumstances
in deciding dilution cases (factors which make up the to-
tality of circumstances include history of official voter
discrimination; racially polarized elections; discrimina-
tory provisions such as at-large districts, majority vote,
anti-single shot, etc.; discriminatory slating process; ef-
fects of societal discrimination in education, employment,
health, etc.; racial appeals in campaigns; and, extent of
minority members elected to office).2 9
The recent case of Thornburg v. Gingles ° demonstrates the
reach of Section 2. In spite of the specific caveat that Section 2
does not require proportional representation, the Court's heavy
reliance on the extent of minorities elected to office as the criti-
cal dilution factor, moves the Court close to proportional
representation."'
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
27. Jacobs, supra note 18.
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
30. Thornburg v. Gingles, 474 U.S. 808 (1985).
31. Jacobs, supra note 18.
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PROPOSITION
Proportional representation is not a program bedded in con-
crete. It is rather a flexible concept which can be adapted to the
realities of America or any other country, state or region. It is
not just a theoretical concept but applied politics. Many Conti-
nental European democracies have some form of proportional
representation with the major exception of France. In fact,
France had proportional representation from 1946 to 1958 when
it adopted a majority vote form of parliamentary elections.2
Proportional representation exists in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts (City Council), and New York City (Board of Education),
and works successfully in both instances.33 In fact, proportional
representation was discontinued in certain U.S. cities because it
allowed political and ethnic minorities to be elected. 4
Proportional representation practices exist in other political
forms in America, particularly the Democratic party presidential
delegates selection process. 35 In addition, proportional represen-
tation exists in non-political forms: 17 states require propor-
tional representation (cumulative voting) in electing corporate
directors. 6
The concept is logical; the application is practical. Propor-
tional representation can make America truly democratic.
RESPONSE
Proportional representation has not worked well any where
and particularly in America. It has been attempted in 25 city
councils and one state legislature (Illinois).37 All but one city,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, has discarded proportional represen-
tation. 8 In a country with such diversity of groups, it tends to
divide rather than consolidate. It is contrary to the American
melting pot tradition. If proportional representation cannot
work in cities on a local level and cannot work in one state legis-
lature, it certainly cannot work successfully across America pur-
32. 9 BRITANNICA, supra note 3, at 733.
33. Low-Beer, supra note 2, at 186 n.103.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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suant to a constitutional amendment.
We have a system which, with a lot of help, is now working.
We need to retain that system and increase its democratic effi-
ciency. We have not given the system ample opportunity to ob-
tain complete success since the Voting Rights Act was last
amended in 1982.19
PROPOSITION
Proportional representation, of course, requires some form
of at-large voting, i.e., for all at-large seats or in a series of
multi-member districts. The critical distinction between at-large
voting as we know it and at-large voting in a proportional repre-
sentation electoral scheme is that proportional representation
prevents an equal voting preference for all positions available.
Both the Hare system, which allows voters to cast their votes for
each candidate in order of preference, or the list system, which
allows each voter to vote on the party's list of candidates, have
built in mechanisms to protect the integrity of the process.4
This process allows several differant candidates to be selected by
several different constituencies. Every district, no matter how
the lines are drawn, has different ideological constituencies, just
as there are different ages, economic classes, educational back-
grounds and other factors which may affect voter perspective.
Proportional representation is truly democratic because it allows
each voter to express weighted preferences and, more impor-
tantly, have some degree of representation in accord with these
varied ideologies after the election is over. There are no disen-
franchised citizens under proportional representation electoral
systems.
A hybrid system of proportional representation may be uti-
lized in those instances where competing. values are substantial.
For instance, Germany has a dual system. Half the legislative
body is elected from single member districts and the other half
is alloted to parties to make total representation proportional to
the total vote received." This particular hybrid system solves
39. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a),(b)
(1982)).
40. BRITANNICA, supra note 3, at 1007.
41. Low-Beer, supra note 2, at 187.
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the concern of the single member districts proponents.
RESPONSE
The proportional representation system requires at-large
districts and at-large voting in some form. We have seen the
evils of at-large districts over the years and the impact it has on
minority election opportunities. Even in some hybrid form of
proportional representation, i.e., several multi-member districts,
larger districts work against poor and minority candidates be-
cause of the increased resources required to effectively
campaign.
The larger the district, the more likely elected officials will
reduce contact with constituencies whatever their persuasion.
This remoteness commences with the campaign for election in
large districts where candidates are unable to visit all areas and
people. After the election, the remoteness multiplies in geomet-
ric progression.
In single member districts, the winner represents all resi-
dents of the district regardless of the source of electoral support.
Unlike multi-member disticts, there is little doubt what official
is responsible for particular public matters in that district. In
short, single member districts promote accountability.
PROPOSITION
A real problem with the American electoral system is candi-
dates run against each other rather than for the office. Too
often, the most successful candidates win by tearing down their
opponents. In addition, if the election is not decided by destroy-
ing the opponent, it is often decided on personality and other
purely cosmetic issues. This is a result of the winner take all
system and cannot be corrected under our current electoral sys-
tem. A constitutional amendment requiring proportional repre-
sentation will correct these deficiencies.
In multi-member districts, more than one person wins. In
addition, not every candidate seeks the same vote. A candidate
can be more honest and appeal to his/her true constituency
rather than appealing to a majority by making every principle
sufficiently elastic to fit any belief or position.
A key benefit of a constitutional amendment requiring pro-
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portional representation is the representation of the full range of
political, cultural and social views that make up this country. To
date, the views represented in legislatures and other multi-mem-
ber bodies vary from liberal to conservative. A careful analysis of
the Congress, state legislatures and other multi-member bodies
reveals that 90% of the members fall within the moderate
category.
The "winner take all" electoral system resulted in two major
parties during most of the 200-year history of the Constitution.
Many political observers view the Democratic and Republican
parties as "Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum." A close analysis
reveals only a difference in emphasis. There is little basic differ-
ence in philosophy between the two parties.
The American political spectrum contains little room for the
original thinker or politician. The system reduces all to the low-
est common denominator. The original political thinkers must
seek college and university havens. It is inconceivable that not
one socialist has been elected to the U.S. Congress or any state
legislature. Surely there must be sufficient persons in America
who subscribe to the socialist philosophy to elect a few repre-
sentatives out of thousands. Proportional representation will
sweep away this archaic, "winner take all" system. The various
competing political ideologies existing on this planet would
spring forth.
The political spectrum is tightly drawn and affects not only
political candidates but the entire range of free speech. Since
discussions are entirely theoretical, they become mere exercises
in mental gymnastics. Candidates have no real opportunity to
test different ideas in the political marketplace.
RESPONSE
The American electoral political system provides full oppor-
tunity for free expression. The Constitution is grounded in the
first amendment. Ample allowances are made for freedom of
speech in every form. If freedom of speech is not fully utilized,
such shortcomings are not chargeable to the electoral system.
Whatever inhibitions may exist, if any, will not be affected by a
proportional representation constitutional amendment.
There is an obvious absence of elected representatives in
the various legislative bodies representing the opposing eco-
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nomic and political viewpoints of our nation's minority groups.
That absence is a clear function of the success of the economic
system rather than the method of electing legislative members.
Even with proportional representation there would be an ab-
sence of representation advocating different economic/political
systems. Political systems are expressions of the economic sys-
tem. Rarely are economic systems expressions of the political
system. We cannot expect America to run contrary to the basic
law of nature.
Too much is made of the few differences in the major politi-
cal parties. The differences are major and manifest themselves
in thousands of ways. Those differences are particularly signifi-
cant for the poor, the minority and the average working person.
If disbelief has set in, please compare the plight of minority
groups under Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon or
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The differences are too nu-
merous to describe. The totality is the difference between strug-
gling against the U.S. government with all its resources or hav-
ing those resources assist in numerous ways.
It is most interesting that the march toward single-member
districts has not produced the election of proponents of a wide
range of economic/political systems. Again, that lack of develop-
ment can be attributed to the stability of the economic and po-
litical systems.
Finally, there is value in a system which requires members
of multi-member political bodies to seek a majority. It forces
each candidate to broaden his/her views; representatives become
inclusive rather than exclusive. Our system also forces elected
officials to become "solution oriented" rather than "position ori-
ented." This dynamic results in problem-solving officials rather
than philosophical rhetoric.
PROPOSITION
Ethnic minorities, as well as political minorities, would have
greater representation upon enactment of a proportional repre-
sentation constitutional amendment. The proportional represen-
tation system would allow more ethnic minorities to seek office
and be elected regardless of their views. The single member dis-
tricting requirement of large blocks of minorities residing in con-
tiguous areas would be removed. Yet, the minorities could come
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together and elect candidates of their choice. Instead of today's
maximum .68 to 1 ratio of Black representation in Alabama's
legislative delegation as compared to Black population percent-
age, we my well have a one to one ratio.
If minorities are not treated fairly within the parties, they
can form their own party and secure fair representation in
multi-member bodies under a proportional representation elec-
toral system. As things now stand, minorities have not formed
separate parties because of the majority vote requirement. Their
success level would be no greater and may be less in a separate
party. Of course, the two major parties realize this fact of life
and take minorities for granted, except on election day.
Of course, any election scheme can be manipulated and es-
chew the predictable results. The argument that minority votes
would be at a disadvantage in a proportional representation sys-
tem simply does not hold water. Minority voters have shown
themselves to be as sophisticated and organized as any other
voting group. If necessary, they can organize their vote to secure
their fair share of elected representatives.
RESPONSE
There is no guarantee that the minority representatives
would increase under a country-wide proportional representa-
tion system. In fact, the percentage may well decrease.
A well-coordinated scheme between voters of considerable
sophistication could reduce the opportunities for election. This
is no pipe dream since it is common practice for powerful major-
ity politicians to persuade several minority candidates to enter
races to split the vote. Such a likelihood increases significantly
under the proportional representation system. On the other
hand, if elected officials are not selected on an individual basis
but are selected by party, then we may end up e between voters
of considerable sophistication could reduce the opportunities for
election. This is no pipe dream oncerning the advantages of pro-
portional representation. Among those are the following:
Proportional representation would make political
parties more cohesive in ideology and better represent
their constituencies' views:
Proportional representation would increase the voter
1988] 359
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turn out, which is greatly needed in America with the
lowest voter turnout of any industrial democracy;
Proportional representation would reduce violation of the
one person, one vote principle now inherent in single-
member districts which allow minority representation.
Suffice it to say, that each of the foregoing has merit.
The case for proportional representation is irrefutable on
both logical and practical grounds. A constitutional amendment
incorporating the proportional representation concept for all
multi-member bodies should be drafted and proposed forthwith.
There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has
come. Proportional representation is an idea whose time has
come.
RESPONSE
There are numerous other arguments against proportional
representation. A few are as follows:
A proportional representation constitutional amend-
ment would reek great havoc in the political sphere by
requiring changes in every electoral system in the nation;
America needs more experimentation with proportional
representation in individual local systems so that the
best form of proportional representation may be selected
before any constitutional amendment is considered;
Proportional representation would result in instability in
the political system such as experienced in Italy over the
last 40 years where change of government occurs all too
frequently;
Proportional representation would ultimately require
voting strictly for the party instead of individuals which
run counter to the American way;
The political and social atmosphere is not conducive to
proportional representation and any system which runs
contrary to political and social forces is bound to fail re-
gardless of the theoretical foundation;
There is no likelihood of a proportional representation
constitutional amendment being enacted and it is a waste
of time to even propose such;
A constitutional basis for proportional representation al-
[Vol. V
1988] PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 361
ready exists, providing the Supreme Court moves in that
direction. Therefore, a simple statute would be sufficient
to enact proportional representation; and
Proportional representation may lock minorities into a
limited number of positions that cannot be expanded to
at-large offices such as President.
The list of reasons why a proportional representation con-
stitutional amendment is inappropriate is long and substantive.
However, it boils down to the hard, cold fact that we have a
system that is finally working. It makes no sense to tinker with a
working system which is becoming more representative.

